<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>IAM on Chen Kai Blog</title><link>https://www.chenk.top/en/tags/iam/</link><description>Recent content in IAM on Chen Kai Blog</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Sun, 03 May 2026 09:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://www.chenk.top/en/tags/iam/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Alibaba Cloud Full Stack (6): RAM, KMS, and Cloud Security</title><link>https://www.chenk.top/en/aliyun-fullstack/06-ram-security/</link><pubDate>Sun, 03 May 2026 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.chenk.top/en/aliyun-fullstack/06-ram-security/</guid><description>&lt;p>I once found a DashScope API key hardcoded in a public GitHub repo. It was mine. Someone had forked a demo I pushed months earlier, and the key was sitting in a config file I forgot to gitignore. By the time I noticed, the key had been used to generate 14,000 Qwen API calls in a single weekend. The bill was not catastrophic — DashScope per-token pricing is forgiving — but the lesson was. I had treated cloud security as something I would figure out later. &amp;ldquo;Later&amp;rdquo; arrived as a billing alert at 2 AM on a Sunday.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Cloud Computing (6): Cloud Security and Privacy Protection</title><link>https://www.chenk.top/en/cloud-computing/security-privacy/</link><pubDate>Sun, 07 May 2023 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.chenk.top/en/cloud-computing/security-privacy/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;figure class="article-figure">
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&lt;p>In 2019 Capital One lost a hundred million customer records. The exploit chain was small: a misconfigured WAF allowed server-side request forgery against the EC2 metadata endpoint, that endpoint handed back IAM credentials, and the IAM role those credentials belonged to had wildcard &lt;code>s3:*&lt;/code> on every bucket in the account. One misconfiguration, one over-broad role, one rule the security team had not written. The bill, before legal: more than 80 million dollars.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>